Coin Slot
Issue: 1978 June 041 - Page 46
Coin Slot Magazine - #041 - 1978 - June [International Arcade Museum]
We must be true to our concepts of fair play and freedom we
enjoy as American citizens. The State interest must be compelling
when fundamental rights are at stake.
One cannot ignore the State interest to prohibit gambling.
Making a "fast buck" instead of productive labor offends our society.
Gambling also may breed organized criminal activity. Yet, these
interests are not served by punishing or prosecuting an individual
who simply owns a "slot machine" as portrayed here, and keeps it
in his own home. This court, frankly, does not believe the Illinois
Legislature intended to make the innocuous act of the defendant a
violation of the law and if it did comprehend such activity, it did
so unconstitutionally.
The Stanley Court supra, declared admittedly obscene material
to be protected in one's home. It would be inconsistent for this
court to consider the more offensive obscene "material" protected
when the less offensive "mechanism" as described acts as a basis for
prosecution.
In Stanley at 568 and 569, the State of Georgia argued that the
"prohibition of possession of obscene material is a necessity incident
to the statutory schemes prohibiting distribution."
In the case sub judice, the State of Illinois argues that the prohi
bition of all ownership of slot machines is necessary to curb illegal
gambling activity.
Stanley rejected this bootstrapping and so does this court because
the fundamental rights of the individual are involved, the right to
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Consti
tution. Also the application of the Statute in question is a violation
of Article I, Section 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution which
provides "No person shall be deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property
without due process of law nor be denied equal protection of the
law.
Illinois' argument is weakened further because the evidence
in the instant case establishes that the subject slot machine may not
be readily serviceable as a gambling device, an area wherein the
state interest would be manifested.
Therefore, the State's reliance on Bobel v. People, 173 III. 19
(1898) must fade when one realized that Bobel relied on the theory
that proscription of all "slot machines" where necessary for an
.com
m
:
u
m
e
basis as a basis for "compelling
mus interest" to infringe the rights
d fro de- state
e
d
of individuals.
loa .arca merit that there are certain First Amend
n
Finally, o it
is not without
w
D
www in this case. The entertainment, the enjoyment,
ment rights involved
/
/
:
p
htt or "horoscopic" reaction one may derive from pulling
the feeling
effective enforcement, for, as stated, Stanley clearly rejected this
an arm of the machine, perception of symbols, the variation of
© The International Arcade Museum
44
http://www.arcade-museum.com/
We must be true to our concepts of fair play and freedom we
enjoy as American citizens. The State interest must be compelling
when fundamental rights are at stake.
One cannot ignore the State interest to prohibit gambling.
Making a "fast buck" instead of productive labor offends our society.
Gambling also may breed organized criminal activity. Yet, these
interests are not served by punishing or prosecuting an individual
who simply owns a "slot machine" as portrayed here, and keeps it
in his own home. This court, frankly, does not believe the Illinois
Legislature intended to make the innocuous act of the defendant a
violation of the law and if it did comprehend such activity, it did
so unconstitutionally.
The Stanley Court supra, declared admittedly obscene material
to be protected in one's home. It would be inconsistent for this
court to consider the more offensive obscene "material" protected
when the less offensive "mechanism" as described acts as a basis for
prosecution.
In Stanley at 568 and 569, the State of Georgia argued that the
"prohibition of possession of obscene material is a necessity incident
to the statutory schemes prohibiting distribution."
In the case sub judice, the State of Illinois argues that the prohi
bition of all ownership of slot machines is necessary to curb illegal
gambling activity.
Stanley rejected this bootstrapping and so does this court because
the fundamental rights of the individual are involved, the right to
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Consti
tution. Also the application of the Statute in question is a violation
of Article I, Section 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution which
provides "No person shall be deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property
without due process of law nor be denied equal protection of the
law.
Illinois' argument is weakened further because the evidence
in the instant case establishes that the subject slot machine may not
be readily serviceable as a gambling device, an area wherein the
state interest would be manifested.
Therefore, the State's reliance on Bobel v. People, 173 III. 19
(1898) must fade when one realized that Bobel relied on the theory
that proscription of all "slot machines" where necessary for an
.com
m
:
u
m
e
basis as a basis for "compelling
mus interest" to infringe the rights
d fro de- state
e
d
of individuals.
loa .arca merit that there are certain First Amend
n
Finally, o it
is not without
w
D
www in this case. The entertainment, the enjoyment,
ment rights involved
/
/
:
p
htt or "horoscopic" reaction one may derive from pulling
the feeling
effective enforcement, for, as stated, Stanley clearly rejected this
an arm of the machine, perception of symbols, the variation of
© The International Arcade Museum
44
http://www.arcade-museum.com/
Future scanning projects are planned by the International Arcade Museum Library (IAML).