Play Meter

Even so, Bally stayed out. But it soon became clear that radical changes in the directions of industry leadership were being made through AD MA anyway. The Mesquite case, a shooin Supreme Court victory for amusement-only games, was derailed by industry lawyers who claimed it was too risky to face the High Court with our tainted image and dubious story. Industry resistance to the spread of gray area games was terminated. Cooperation with municipal authorities, industry responses to genuine problems and trouble spots, and the development of industry-oriented model ordinance provisions, were such a surprise, then, that AGMA would try to take over operatororiented AOE, when the latter proved it could succeed handsomely carrying out a strictly amusementonly policy and sponsoring noholds-barred seminar discussions over the entire range of operator interests. It was not surprising, either, that the takeover attempt last summer should be high-handed, without warning or any attempt to open peaceable negotiations before announcing ASI. It was only a little puzzling, from a lawyer's viewpoint, that the move was so clumsy. behind a smokescreen of hype and hoopla, the manufacturers began focusing even more narrowly on problems that concern only their own interests... JJ ... ttme as run out, and neither Play Meter nor ] VI can change the course of events by themselves.'' •••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• h 11 • •• •••••••••••••••••••• halted. Even the bland public relations program launched jointly by AGMA, A VMDA, and AMOA was dropped. Then in mid-1982 a major shift took place. Bally moved in openly as a member, the name of the association was changed to AGMA, and behind a smokescreen of hype and hoopla (Bally had fielded a hypeand-hoopla man named Tomlinson to promote bingos, with unsatisfactory results in 1971.), the manufacturers began focusing even more narrowly on problems that concern only their own interests: copyright infringements, speed-up and conversion kits, FCC compliance, UL standards, etc. Subjects affecting the future of the industry and the welfare of operators-gray area invasions, blue sky artists, signs of real organized crime infiltration, hostile lawmakers, unreasonable local regulators, unfair taxes, location ownership, coin-operated lotteries, saturated markets, "duds" and "dogs," and low quality engineering-seem to have become taboo. It should not really have been PLAY METER, February 15. 1984 II ' •••••••••••••••••••• T he Antitrust Case No one denies that if the manufacturers approached it fairly and reasonably, they could join together and put on a national trade show of their own, to promote the sale of their own games. That would be legitimate competition and might be wholesome for the industry. But pursuing a lawful end by unlawful means is as wrong as if the end itself were unlawful. For example, I have a perfect right to plant my cornfield next to yours, or open my game room across the street from you. But I cannot lawfully poison your plantings, or claim falsely that your game room is a source of Legionnaires disease-or firebomb you. And by the same token, under this country's antitrust laws which have been on the books for nearly a century, I cannot organize a boycott against you by corn-buyers or corn-seed sellers, or game room patrons . I cannot destroy you as a competitor even by cutting prices if to do so would create a "monopoly" of a market in which I am not restrained by the ordinary forces of competition. Specifically, the antitrust laws known as the Sherman and Clayton Acts make it illegal, both as federal crimes and as bases for recovery of treble damages, for two or more persons to conspire, which means to act in concert with a common purpose, to restrain trade or commerce "unreasonably" or by "unfair practices." It is self-evident that in small industry like ours, with mlly two existing national trade shows, manufacturers who control most of the exhibits cannot agree to launch a new show at almost the same time and place as one already announced by one of their potential rivals. That amounts to illegal restraint (i.e., not mere fair competition). The only defense to such charges would be proof by each of the associations and their officers and directors that every one of them had acted independently, without any common purpose of mutual agreement. But that is refuted by admitted facts: it was publicly announced at the outset that the decision to stage ASI was reached, and the time and place chosen, at a meeting of AGMA's board of directors who met in Alexandria for that purpose, among others, in May 1983. Thereafter, other acts were taken in concert and by mutual agreement to further carry out the purpose of destroying AOE. These, too, have been publicly announced and admitted, including the withdrawal and cancellation of space by exhibitors who had already signed up for AOE, the refusal to sign up by others who had made tentative commitments and who had participated in prior shows, and express agreements which constitute, in effect, an unlawful boycott. The manufacturers' community is so small there is also a strong inference that simultaneously pulling their advertisements out of Play Meter was done by unlawful agreement. By becoming a participant and cosponsor, AVMDA has tied itself to all the acts and agreements chargeable to AGMA, even if it has not added independently to the conspiracy. At the same time, and also by mutual agreement, the associations and their officers and member companies have sought to injure AOE independently-unfair practices and unreasonable restraint of trade-by what the courts sometimes characterize as "dirty tricks." These "dirty tricks" include claims that attendance at AOE 1983 had a 9