Coin Slot

Issue: 1981 January 071

Coin Slot Magazine - #071 - 1981 - January [International Arcade Museum]
work does not have a commonly
accepted meaning. In such cases, it is
the responsibility of the courts, in the
absence
of
clarification
by
the
legislature, to provide meanings for
such words on a case-by-case basis.
The use of the word "antique" in
Section 330.7 of the Penal Code of the
State of California, as used in
reference to slot machines, has no
commonly accepted meaning, it can
be argued, the Legislature failed to
provide one. While the Legislature,
with very careful and extensive wor
ding (192 words), strived to define
"slot machine" in Section 330b(2) of
the Penal Code (relating to the illegal
possession of slot machines), it made
no attempt to define "antique" in the
1976
amendment permitting
the
possession of certain slot machines.
The statute provides that possession
is legal "if the defendant shows that
the slot machine is an antique slot
machine and was not operated for
gambling purposes while in the
defendant's possession." Note the
burden of proof for the person ac
cused
of illegal
possession:
For a
defense to any such prosecution,
such person must (1) prove that the
machine
is an "antique" and (2)
prove that the machine was not
operated
for gambling purposes
while in such person's possession.
The difficulties inherent in meeting
the burden of proof under point (2)
are beyond the scope of this article,
but they would appear to be for
midable, if the wording of the statute
is to be taken literally.
The key which unlocks the door to
the legal possession (and collection)
of slot machines in California is the
final sentence of sub-section (a) of
Section 330.7: For the purposes of
this section, a slot machine shall be
CONCLUSIVELY
PRESUMED
(emphasis added) an antique slot
machine if it was manufactured prior
to 1941. What does this statement
mean? Is it a "definition" of an "an
tique slot machine"? Is it something
less - a "description" of an "antique
slot machine"? In fact, it is neither. It
is nothing more than a statement of
public policy to the effect that a
person accused of the illegal posses
sion of a slot machine is relieved of
the burden of proving that it is an
"antique" by proving that the machine
was manufactured prior to 1941.
(Note that the burden of proving that
it was not operated for gambling
machine manufactured AFTER 1941
may qualify an an "antique," but the
absence of any legislative guidelines
make such burden of proof difficult
(hence,
the
suggestion
of
a
'professional" definition in my letter
published in the September, 1980
issue of The Coin Slot). Hopefully,
courts
will
take
a
common
sense
approach
to
this
problem
and
recognize on their own that the date
of manufacture of an item is not
necessarily the key factor in deter
mining whether such item qualifies as
an "antique". Funk & Wagnall suggest
the following as meanings of the word
"antique": out-of-date; fashioned; ob
solete; ancient; very old; of an earlier
period: especially, an old object priz
ed for its rarity, excellence of style or
craft, etc. (emphasis added). Unfor
tunately, even machines originally
manufactured prior to 1941 may be
"suspect" under California law. How
Come? The fault lies with the am
biguity of the word "manufactured" as
used in sub-section (a) of Section
330.7.
Does
this
word
mean
"COMPLETELY
manufactu red"?
Suppose that all of the parts were
manufactured prior to 1941 but not
assembled until after 1941? Suppose
that on a machine manufactured prior
to 1941 the denomination of the coin
chute was changed in 1945 with a part
manufactured prior to 1941? Suppose
that a pre-1941 machine is restored
using springs manufactured after
1941? Fortunately, the California
legislature did provide some help for
the solution of this type of problem; at
least, the wording of sub-section (c)
provides the court with something "to
hang its hat on" if it wishes to reach a
common sense solution: "It is the
purpose of this section to protect the
collection
AND
RESTORATION
(emphasis added) of antique slot
machines NOT PRESENTLY UTILIZ
ED FOR GAMBLING PURPOSES
(emphasis added) because of their
aesthetic interest and importance in
California history." It is common
knowledge
that
landmarks,
automobiles,
clocks,
etc
are
"restored" with parts and/or material
made in the present. In many cases,
originally manufactured parts and
materials are not available, and the
only means of preserving works of art
and the like is to use that which is
.com
m
u
e available for
:
restoration. Of course,
rom -mus the more "authentic"
f
a restored item,
d
e
e
d
d
a
the greater its value; but many collec
a
o
l
c
r
n
purposes
w If .a the defendant tors prefer "availability" to "authen
Dow remains.)
w
w
cannot prove
that
the
machine
was
ticity." The decision should be made
://
manufactured
http before 1941, the defen in the market place, NOT in the court
dant must then go forth with the
burden of proving that it is an "an
tique." It follows, of course, that a
© The
International
Arcade Museum
JANUARY,
1981
room (absent, of course, fraudulent
misrepresentations and other forms
of dishonesty).
Let's
spend
our
money on collection and restoration,
not legal fees.
A "common sense" approach to the
judiciary's solving of problems aris
ing from the legislature's failure to
define "antique" slot machine is
represented by a case heard in the
Orange County Superior Court of the
State of California. This lower court's
ruling (in contrast with an appellate
court's ruling) is not likely to carry
much weight as precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis, but the
reasoning of the court is so sound
that it is likely to be persuasive in
future cases involving similar issues.
The transcript of the case does not
provide either a clear or complete
statement of the facts, and, at the time
of
this
writing,
the
author's
knowledge of the facts is limited to
that which appears in the transcript.
The story behind the case is told
elsewhere. It appears, however, that
members of the Costa Mesa Police
Department confiscated certain slot
machines in the possession of John
T. Collins. It also appears that, while
the
machines
were
originally
manufactured prior to 1941, their
restoration involved using a number
of
"foreign"
parts and/or "new
replacement" parts. The law enforce
ment officials apparently took the
position urged by a competitor of Mr.
Collins that the percentage of such
parts in these machines was such as
to destroy their "antique" status. Mr.
Collins petitioned the Superior Court
for an order directing the return of the
machines.
The
presiding
judge,
Everett W.
Dickey,
granted the
petitioner's motion and, in an un
usually lengthy opinion for aSuperior
Court, explained his reasons fordo
ing so. The following is an analysis of
that. First, the court points out that the
statute creating an exception for
certain antique slot machines to the
gambling device statutes is of recent
origin; that this court had no access to
any case law dealing with this par
ticular statute; and that, consequent
ly, there is nothing to guide the court
with respect to what the Legislature
meant (i.e., by using the terms "an
tique" and "manufactured"). The
court notes that the only clue to the
meaning of "antique" intended by the
Legislature is the statement at the end
of the statute that the purpose of the
antique exemption is to protect the
collection and restoration of antique
slot machines not presently utilized
for gambling purposes because of
their aesthetic interests and impor
tance in California history.
In what must have been said in a
humorous
vein,
the
court
Continued on page 12
THE COIN SLOT —11
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Coin Slot Magazine - #071 - 1981 - January [International Arcade Museum]
Continued from page 11
acknowledges the aesthetic interest
of the confiscated machines on the
basis of the prices they are selling for.
The Legislative intent in mentioning
the importance of slot machines in
California history cannot be explain
ed on the basis of any evidence before
the court. There is no evidence that
any of these machines were manufac
tured in California, and there is no
evidence
that
any
particular
manufacturer of slot machines has
ever done business in California.
(Author's comment: Attorneys handl
ing such cases in the future are
advised that evidence of such matters
exists; for example, Mills Novelty
Company did business in Oakland for
many years. There is plenty of
evidence that manufacturers did
business in California as late as the
1940's. Slots were also manufactured
in California. The first one-armed
bandit was invented in San Francisco
by Charles Fey. Apart from this, it is
this writer's view that the real impor
tance of slots in the history of Califor
nia was their widespread use and
appeal. There is plenty of evidence of
that, too. Quaere, whether a research
of
legislative
committee
reports
would be helpful in this regard.)
Since no evidence of the impor
tance of slot machines in California
history was presented to the court,
the mere legislative reference to that
importance does not provide any
guideline as to what constitutes an
"antique" slot machine.
The Court then reviews briefly the
various laws in California applicable
to the use of slot machines for gambl
ing and the mere possession of slot
machines; a review of such laws, the
court concludes, does not shed any
light on what the Legislature meant
by the reference to the "importance of
slot machines in California history."
By way of dictum, the court
suggests that TOTAL REPRODUC
TIONS
OR
COPIES
(emphasis
added) of antique slot machines
wouid not qualify for the protection
afforded antique slot machines. In
this case, however, the machines in
question are not total reproductions.
The following statements of the court
are the cornerstones of a judicially
structured definition of an antique
slot machine:
"What we have in evidence here are
machines
that
were
originally
mechanical slot machines of the type
now made obsolete for casino use by
virtue of the advent of electronic slot
machines over a quarter of a century
ago. Even though all of them were not
necessarily manufactured before that
time (sic). These machines are in
various stages of restoration, con
taining varying percentages of new
and original replacement parts. But
there is no reason to believe that any
of them were originally manufactured
for the purpose of being sold as
antiques."
The wording of the statute makes it
clear that the restoration, as well as
the
collection,
of
antique
slot
machines is protected. Since the
legislature did not define "restora
tion," the Court relies on the dic
tionary definition: "To bring back to a
former or normal condition as by
repairing, rebuilding, altering, and so
forth." The court concludes that the
machines in question are antique slot
machines which have been "restored"
(as provided by the statute) in varying
degrees. The court adds the following
important statement: "The conclusive
presumption of the statute itself im
plies that machines manufactured
SINCE 1941 (emphasis added) may
be antiques.
Despite the fact that the court has
already concluded, for the reasons
mentioned above, that the machines
in question are "antiques" for the
purposes of the applicable Penal
Code section, the court provides ad
ditional reasons for its decision by
referring to universally accepted prin
ciples of interpretation of criminal
law. Since the statute in question is
vague and is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, it must be
interpretations is used in a penal law,
ordinarily the construction that is
more favorable to the (alleged)
offender (e.g., collector or dealer) will
be adopted by the court.
The court stresses the fact that the
Legislature could have defined "an
tique" slot machine if it had chosen to
do so. In particular, the court stresses
that the Legislature chose NOT to
limit the meaning of "antique" slot
machine to one with original parts or
one shown to have been manufac
tured in California. It follows, the
Court concludes, that it is NOT up to
the police or the Courts to decide, in
any
particular
case,
what
the
Legislature was specifically talking
about. (In other words, the Courts
should
refuse to place specific
limitations on the kinds of machines
protected other than those clearly
specified by the statute.)
The Court provides still another
reason for its decision: There is no
evidence, as provided by the litigants
in this case, that the business of
obtaining slot machines and restor
interpreted
in
a
manner
most
favorable to the person charged with
ing them with new parts as needed so
as to make them fully operable and
salable at a profit constitutes a threat
a crime or wrongdoing. While Mr.
Collins was not (apparently) so
charged, the confiscation of his
machines took on a penal nature, and
to the anti-gambling statutes of
California. If such a threat exists, it is
up to the Legislature to deal with it,
not the police or the Courts.
he is entitled to the benefit of the
principle just stated. The practical
In its closing remarks, the Court
makes the following significant state
significance of this principle here is
stated in the following remarks of the
court, "In other words, criminal
statutes will not be built up by judicial
grafting
upon
legislation."
As
applicable to the issues in this case,
this means (1) that the court will not
limit the protection of the statute to
machines
manufactured prior to
1941, (2) that the court will not limit
the protection of this statute to
restorations using only original and
Americamade parts, and (3) that
the court will not limit the protection
m to restorations in
of this o
.c a statute
m
volving
specified limited percentage
:
u
of new and/or foreign parts. The true
from -muse
d
e
e
d
basis for this liberal approach to the
d
a
nlo w.arca
matter is stated in Section 4 of the
w
o
D
w
Penal Code: All provisions in the
w
://
penal statutes are to be construed
http
© 12
The
Arcade
Museum
— International
THE COIN
SLOT
whether a particular machine is an
"antique," the owner is entitled to the
benefit of every reasonable doubt,
whether such doubt arises out of a
question of fact or out of a question as
to the true interpretation of language
used in a penal statute. It follows, as
the court points out, when language
that is reasonably susceptible of two
according to the fair import of their
terms, with a view to effect its objects
and to promote justice. If it is not clear
ment:
"So in essence, I think, gentlemen,
what the Court is saying, that among
the various definitions of 'antique'
which are available and which are
possible meanings of the legislature
in the use of the word, that certainly
these are in the style of the machines
which are now obsolete by virtue of
the electronic machines coming on to
the scene. And even though they may
not all be ancient in the sense that
many laymen might use the term
'antique,' they are in the style of a
machine from a bygone day which is
not any longer used for organized
commercial gambling purposes."
In summary, the following obser
vations, based upon the rulings and
the reasoning of the Court with
respect
to
California
law,
may
be
helpful to litigants in the future, not
Continued on page 29
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JANUARY, 1981

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