Coin Slot Magazine - #071 - 1981 - January [International Arcade Museum]
work does not have a commonly
accepted meaning. In such cases, it is
the responsibility of the courts, in the
absence
of
clarification
by
the
legislature, to provide meanings for
such words on a case-by-case basis.
The use of the word "antique" in
Section 330.7 of the Penal Code of the
State of California, as used in
reference to slot machines, has no
commonly accepted meaning, it can
be argued, the Legislature failed to
provide one. While the Legislature,
with very careful and extensive wor
ding (192 words), strived to define
"slot machine" in Section 330b(2) of
the Penal Code (relating to the illegal
possession of slot machines), it made
no attempt to define "antique" in the
1976
amendment permitting
the
possession of certain slot machines.
The statute provides that possession
is legal "if the defendant shows that
the slot machine is an antique slot
machine and was not operated for
gambling purposes while in the
defendant's possession." Note the
burden of proof for the person ac
cused
of illegal
possession:
For a
defense to any such prosecution,
such person must (1) prove that the
machine
is an "antique" and (2)
prove that the machine was not
operated
for gambling purposes
while in such person's possession.
The difficulties inherent in meeting
the burden of proof under point (2)
are beyond the scope of this article,
but they would appear to be for
midable, if the wording of the statute
is to be taken literally.
The key which unlocks the door to
the legal possession (and collection)
of slot machines in California is the
final sentence of sub-section (a) of
Section 330.7: For the purposes of
this section, a slot machine shall be
CONCLUSIVELY
PRESUMED
(emphasis added) an antique slot
machine if it was manufactured prior
to 1941. What does this statement
mean? Is it a "definition" of an "an
tique slot machine"? Is it something
less - a "description" of an "antique
slot machine"? In fact, it is neither. It
is nothing more than a statement of
public policy to the effect that a
person accused of the illegal posses
sion of a slot machine is relieved of
the burden of proving that it is an
"antique" by proving that the machine
was manufactured prior to 1941.
(Note that the burden of proving that
it was not operated for gambling
machine manufactured AFTER 1941
may qualify an an "antique," but the
absence of any legislative guidelines
make such burden of proof difficult
(hence,
the
suggestion
of
a
'professional" definition in my letter
published in the September, 1980
issue of The Coin Slot). Hopefully,
courts
will
take
a
common
sense
approach
to
this
problem
and
recognize on their own that the date
of manufacture of an item is not
necessarily the key factor in deter
mining whether such item qualifies as
an "antique". Funk & Wagnall suggest
the following as meanings of the word
"antique": out-of-date; fashioned; ob
solete; ancient; very old; of an earlier
period: especially, an old object priz
ed for its rarity, excellence of style or
craft, etc. (emphasis added). Unfor
tunately, even machines originally
manufactured prior to 1941 may be
"suspect" under California law. How
Come? The fault lies with the am
biguity of the word "manufactured" as
used in sub-section (a) of Section
330.7.
Does
this
word
mean
"COMPLETELY
manufactu red"?
Suppose that all of the parts were
manufactured prior to 1941 but not
assembled until after 1941? Suppose
that on a machine manufactured prior
to 1941 the denomination of the coin
chute was changed in 1945 with a part
manufactured prior to 1941? Suppose
that a pre-1941 machine is restored
using springs manufactured after
1941? Fortunately, the California
legislature did provide some help for
the solution of this type of problem; at
least, the wording of sub-section (c)
provides the court with something "to
hang its hat on" if it wishes to reach a
common sense solution: "It is the
purpose of this section to protect the
collection
AND
RESTORATION
(emphasis added) of antique slot
machines NOT PRESENTLY UTILIZ
ED FOR GAMBLING PURPOSES
(emphasis added) because of their
aesthetic interest and importance in
California history." It is common
knowledge
that
landmarks,
automobiles,
clocks,
etc
are
"restored" with parts and/or material
made in the present. In many cases,
originally manufactured parts and
materials are not available, and the
only means of preserving works of art
and the like is to use that which is
.com
m
u
e available for
:
restoration. Of course,
rom -mus the more "authentic"
f
a restored item,
d
e
e
d
d
a
the greater its value; but many collec
a
o
l
c
r
n
purposes
w If .a the defendant tors prefer "availability" to "authen
Dow remains.)
w
w
cannot prove
that
the
machine
was
ticity." The decision should be made
://
manufactured
http before 1941, the defen in the market place, NOT in the court
dant must then go forth with the
burden of proving that it is an "an
tique." It follows, of course, that a
© The
International
Arcade Museum
JANUARY,
1981
room (absent, of course, fraudulent
misrepresentations and other forms
of dishonesty).
Let's
spend
our
money on collection and restoration,
not legal fees.
A "common sense" approach to the
judiciary's solving of problems aris
ing from the legislature's failure to
define "antique" slot machine is
represented by a case heard in the
Orange County Superior Court of the
State of California. This lower court's
ruling (in contrast with an appellate
court's ruling) is not likely to carry
much weight as precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis, but the
reasoning of the court is so sound
that it is likely to be persuasive in
future cases involving similar issues.
The transcript of the case does not
provide either a clear or complete
statement of the facts, and, at the time
of
this
writing,
the
author's
knowledge of the facts is limited to
that which appears in the transcript.
The story behind the case is told
elsewhere. It appears, however, that
members of the Costa Mesa Police
Department confiscated certain slot
machines in the possession of John
T. Collins. It also appears that, while
the
machines
were
originally
manufactured prior to 1941, their
restoration involved using a number
of
"foreign"
parts and/or "new
replacement" parts. The law enforce
ment officials apparently took the
position urged by a competitor of Mr.
Collins that the percentage of such
parts in these machines was such as
to destroy their "antique" status. Mr.
Collins petitioned the Superior Court
for an order directing the return of the
machines.
The
presiding
judge,
Everett W.
Dickey,
granted the
petitioner's motion and, in an un
usually lengthy opinion for aSuperior
Court, explained his reasons fordo
ing so. The following is an analysis of
that. First, the court points out that the
statute creating an exception for
certain antique slot machines to the
gambling device statutes is of recent
origin; that this court had no access to
any case law dealing with this par
ticular statute; and that, consequent
ly, there is nothing to guide the court
with respect to what the Legislature
meant (i.e., by using the terms "an
tique" and "manufactured"). The
court notes that the only clue to the
meaning of "antique" intended by the
Legislature is the statement at the end
of the statute that the purpose of the
antique exemption is to protect the
collection and restoration of antique
slot machines not presently utilized
for gambling purposes because of
their aesthetic interests and impor
tance in California history.
In what must have been said in a
humorous
vein,
the
court
Continued on page 12
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